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1Strangers to Ourselves: Nietzsche on The Will to Truth, The Scientific 
Spirit, Free Will, and Genuine Selfhood
1. Introduction1
Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals contains many striking claims.  
Perhaps most striking is the claim that the scientific spirit’s will to truth is the 
last expression of the ascetic ideal.  What could Nietzsche mean by this 
extraordinary claim? Before answering this question we need to identify the 
most general aim of the Genealogy.  It is important to unravel Nietzsche’s
general aim because the polemical and rhetorical subtlety of the Genealogy
often allows, indeed deliberately cajoles, the reader into comforting but 
mistaken notions of Nietzsche’s objective.  This typically leads to superficial 
interpretations of such fundamental claims as that the will to truth is an 
expression of the ascetic ideal.  Only when we have recognised his ultimate 
polemical aim are we properly equipped to interpret the full meaning and force 
of such claims.  However, because Nietzsche employs a strategy of deliberate 
misdirection, in order to properly understand his aim it is important to analyse 
his strategy for achieving it.  In the first part of this essay (sections 2 and 3 
below), after first expounding what I take to be Nietzsche’s central strategy 
and aim in the Genealogy, I seek to elucidate some of his central claims about 
the will to truth. It is my general contention that the real target of Nietzsche’s 
polemic only comes explicitly into view when he comes, in the third essay, to 
make his extraordinary claims about the will to truth and science.  That target 
is us, his readers.  Nietzsche argues that our will to truth actually functions as 
a tool to repress and split off part of our nature. The second part of the essay 
(sections 4 and 5 below) deals with Nietzsche’s account of the sovereign 
individual and his related, novel, account of free will.  Both these accounts 
hinge on the notion of the self as an integrated whole.  It is argued that, in 
contrasting the integrated sovereign individual, who has genuine free will, and 
we splintered moderns, who are the mere playthings of a myriad of disparate 
influences, Nietzsche aims to unsettle us with uncanny suggestion that we 
have no genuine selves.  For Nietzsche, we are strangers to ourselves not 
just in the sense that we lack knowledge about our deeper motivations, but in 
the more profound sense that we our estranged from ourselves in that we 
contain drives and affects that our split of from each other. Instead of a unified 
whole we moderns are but a jumbled congery of competing drives.  In the 
third part of this essay (section 6 below) it is shown that the invocation of the 
uncanny is actually a central strategy Nietzsche uses to bring home to us his 
disturbing message that we splintered moderns are strangers to ourselves.
                                                          
1 Quotations from, and references to, Nietzsche’s works make use of the following abbreviations, 'UM' 
for Untimely Meditations, 'GS' for The Gay Science, 'TSZ' for Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 'BGE' for 
Beyond Good and Evil, 'GM' for On the Genealogy of Morals, ’EH’ for Ecce Homo, , 'A' for The 
Antichrist, ‘TI’ for Twilight of the Idols,  'WP' for The Will to Power, 'KSA'  for Sämtliche Werke: 
Kritische Studienausgabe, ‘D’ for Daybreak, and ‘HAH’ for Human, All Too Human.  Full 
bibliographic references for these works and other texts mentioned below are given at the end of this 
essay.
2Part I
2. A Strategy of Misdirection
In the first section of his preface to the Genealogy Nietzsche tells his 
readers, that we are “strangers to ourselves”.  This beautiful and uncanny 
phrase is an echo of the very first line of the preface; 
We are unknown to ourselves, we knowers: and for a good reason.
Of course, in his typical elliptical fashion, Nietzsche does not tell us what that 
good reason is.2  Indeed, the whole theme of our being strangers to ourselves 
is quickly and quietly dropped.  Nietzsche, in the second section of the 
preface, brings up what is ostensibly the focus of the Genealogy, the question 
of the origins of our morality – as Nietzsche says, “that is what this polemic is 
about” [GM, Preface, 2].  Certainly the first essay, with its main theme of the 
triumph of Judeo-Christian slave morality over the Greek/Roman master 
morality, seems to bear out the claim that his polemic is about the origins of 
morality.3  And, to take us further from the opening claim that we are 
strangers to ourselves, Nietzsche suggests in the first essay, and explicitly 
emphasizes in the second, that showing the origins of something tells us little 
if anything about its current purpose and value.  
But if that is so, then, how can Nietzsche’s aim be to show us that we 
are strangers to ourselves?  How can the Genealogy be about who we are, 
when it is telling us mainly about our ancestors?  To see the solution to the 
problem we must realise that the Genealogy, like so many of Nietzsche’s 
                                                          
2  Nietzsche does tell us “We have never sought ourselves” [GM, Preface, 1].  But this is hardly an 
answer to the question of why we are unknown to ourselves.  Since we are knowers who enquire 
persistently about practically everything, it merely raises the question of why have we not sought 
ourselves.
3 Notoriously, the first essay of the Genealogy leaves the reader in some confusion about who exactly 
are the bearers of master morality referred to in the text. In much of the text, especially the early 
sections, it seems Nietzsche has the Greeks in mind. His first explicit mention of a particular nobility is 
that of Greek nobility in section 5, and his characterisation in section 10 of the nobles, as self-affirming 
and merely condescendingly pitying to the slaves, is presented solely with reference to Greek nobility. 
Section 11, which stresses the recklessness and life affirming nature of the nobles, contains references 
to Pericles, the Athenians, Hesiod, and Homer. Indeed, Romans only get sustained mention in section 
16, the penultimate section of the first essay. By contrast, the Jewish slaves of resentiment, who are 
presumably more connected to the Romans than the Greeks, are given substantial mention as early as 
section 7. The early juxtaposition between Jewish slaves and Greek masters is confusing since, of 
course, it was the Romans who were eventually, on Nietzsche's account, conquered by the Jews 
through their conversion to Christianity.   This is  captured in Nietzsche’s phrase, “Judea against 
Rome”; Jewish slave morality directly triumphed over Roman master morality, not Greek master 
morality. This unheralded, confusing displacement of the reference of 'nobles' from Greeks to Romans 
is deliberate and serves a strategic purpose as argued in section 6 below.
.
3texts, divides into a manifest and a latent content.  Nietzsche cannot afford to 
be too explicit about that latent content because it is challenging and 
terrifying, striking at the very centre of our self-conception. Like a clever 
psychoanalyst, he knows that a direct approach will merely awaken the 
patient’s/reader’s defences and provoke a reflex denial and a refusal to 
countenance his message.  Moreover, Nietzsche believes that mere 
intellectual knowledge can often work against deeper forms of realization that 
are necessary for genuine change.  Nietzsche, educated by Schopenhauer, 
regarded consciousness as being a rather shallow phenomenon, almost to 
the point of dismissing it as epiphenomenal.  Prefiguring Freud, he claimed 
that for ideas to be truly effective they must work on us at a level below 
consciousness. Thus, in the Genealogy, he chooses to approach his aim 
obliquely. He starts at some distance from us, with our ancestors and even 
suggests that his examination of them does not have direct and immediate 
consequences for us.  But, in fact, Nietzsche is talking about us, first indirectly 
and later directly.  He is telling us deeply disturbing and momentous truth 
about ourselves, though we may not at first recognise that we are the subjects 
who are being damned in his polemic.  That such indirection is the method of 
the Genealogy is something Nietzsche himself claims in Ecco Homo:
Every time a beginning that is calculated to mislead .... Gradually  ... 
very disagreeable truths are heard grumbling in the distance. [EH, 
Genealogy of Morals A Polemic]
We are for Nietzsche strangers to ourselves for the very good reason 
that to face who we are is a challenge requiring momentous courage, a 
challenge which, properly undertaken, should precipitate a shattering struggle. 
But, as Nietzsche warns us in the very first section of the preface of the 
Genealogy, such challenges provoke strong resistances: 
In such matters we are never really “with it”: we just don’t have our 
heart there – or even our ear.
 Though, he suggests that when his true message is registered, 
we will rub our ears afterwards and ask completely amazed, completely 
disconcerted, “What did we actually experience just now?” still more: 
“who are we actually?” [Nietzsche’s italics]
The italics here are very telling.  The emphasis on ‘afterwards’ is an indication 
of Nietzsche’s belief that only after his message has slowly snuck through our 
defences will we recognise what the Genealogy is really about.  The 
emphasis on ‘are’ is an indication that the Genealogy is ultimately about who 
we are and not, as it might first appear, about who our ancestors were.4
3. Truth and the Ascetic Ideal
                                                          
4  The question of how seriously Nietzsche takes the various historical analyses offered in the 
Genealogy is dealt with in greater detail in section 6 below.
4What then is the kernel of Nietzsche’s message that might lead us to 
question who we really are?  Basically, the Genealogy teaches that our much 
prized morality, in particular, our evaluations of good and evil (essay I), our 
concept of conscience (essay II), and our commitment to truth (essay III) are 
all expressions of impotence and sublimated hostility.  In order to get his 
readers to appreciate this message,  Nietzsche engages his readers’ interest  
by using history as a means for creating a distance between his ostensive 
subject, the origins of morality, and his real subject, the sickness in our 
current morality.  It is in section 23 of the third essay that we find ourselves for 
the first time more directly addressed.  Having  exposed the historical roots of 
our sense of morality, and sense of conscience, characterising these as 
handymen to the life denying ascetic ideal, Nietzsche there asks if there is not 
a new counter-ideal in the modern ideal of truth, objectivity and science.5  
Here he is directly engaging his readers who identify themselves as adhering 
to this modern ideal, which they take as being fundamentally opposed to the 
religiously motivated ascetic ideal.  Secular readers, inspired by 
Enlightenment ideals, have little resistance to recognising that the religious 
founders of Judaeo-Christian morality were in fact inspired by hatred and
envy. They see themselves as being far removed from that religious mentality. 
This provides the comforting “pathos of distance” that allows the first and 
second essay to do their work on the reader. But in section 23 Nietzsche 
provides what he hopes will be a moment of self-recognition when he 
responds to his question about the existence of a counter-ideal by claiming 
that the will to truth, the will to objectivity, is not the means by which we have 
escaped the religious world and its associated ascetic ideal.  Rather, it is, in 
fact, the last and most complete expression of that ideal.  This is the moment 
when we are meant to rub our ears! How is it that we who have thrown off the 
crutches of superstition and religious obscurantism, who have committed 
ourselves to embrace the truth at any cost, and thus relinquished the 
comforting myth of a world to come, can be accused of participating in the 
ascetic ideal?  As Nietzsche himself says, it is our very love of truth that has 
allowed us to realise the falsity behind the ascetic ideal, the hollowness of 
religious claims [cf. GM, III, 27].  Now he relies on our love of truth to force us 
to recognise the true meaning of that very love. Here Nietzsche is thinking 
primarily as a psychologist and is looking at the latent meaning of our 
commitment to truth.  That commitment, he maintains, stems from the same 
motivation that fuelled commitment to religious ascetic values, namely, fear of 
life and feelings of impotence.  
The religious person attempts to remove himself from the torments of 
this world, a world that largely resists his desires, by telling himself that what 
happens in this life is ultimately unimportant. He tells himself that what 
matters is what is in his soul, which will determine his real, eternal, life in the 
world to come.  The modern scholar similarly removes himself from life by 
                                                          
5  In this text where Nietzsche talks of ‘Wissenschaft’ I talk of ‘science’.  However it is important to 
recall that for the German speakers of the 19th century, and indeed for Germans speakers of today, 
Wissenschaft does not simply refer to what we call the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) such as 
physics, chemistry and biology, but also to the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaft) such as philology 
and philosophy and even formal sciences such as Mathematics and Geometry. We do better, then, to 
think of the practitioners of Wissenschaften as scholars than as scientists.
5telling himself that what is of ultimate value is not acting in this world, not what 
he does, but in understanding the world, in what he knows.  Both the religious 
ascetic and the ascetic scholar believe “the truth will set you free”.  Nietzsche 
has realized that here to be free means to be free of the pull of this world, the 
tumult of earthly passions and desires. Just as the ascetic ideal demands 
suppression of the passions, so the scholar’s emphasis on objectivity and 
truth demands “the emotions cooled” [GM III, 25].  Where the religious take 
revenge upon the world by denying that it is of ultimate importance, the 
scholar revenges himself by saying that passive understanding is of greater 
value than “mere” action. The Enlightener values reasons and reasonable 
belief and is suspicious of passions and unreasoned desire.  But life, at least 
genuine life, ultimately is a world of passions and desires.  Thus, claims 
Nietzsche, (the pursuit of) science can act as a means of withdrawal from the 
world:
Science as a means of self-anaesthetisation: are you acquainted with 
that? [Genealogy III, 24 – italics Nietzsche’s]
Indeed, Nietzsche had in earlier works already claimed that such 
repression of passions, as exhibited in the scholar, is part of a death drive.  In 
The Gay Science, in a passage that Nietzsche explicitly directs us to in 
section 28 of the third essay of the Genealogy, he characterises the will not to 
be deceived as something that might be 
a principle hostile to life and destructive - “Will to truth” – that can be a 
hidden will to death. [GS 344]
In the same place he tell us 
those who are truthful in the audacious and ultimate sense that is 
presupposed by the faith in science  thus affirm another world than the 
world of life, nature, and history.  [Nietzsche’s italics]
These thoughts Nietzsche first fully thematized in his early work the 
Untimely Meditations. There, in the second essay,  “On the Advantages and 
Disadvantages of History for Life”, he characterises “the scholar, the man of 
science” as one who “stands aside from life so as to know it unobstructedly”  
[UM, II 10].  Focusing on the use of history, Nietzsche contrasts his demand 
that we use history for “life and action” with the scholar’s use of history for the 
ends of “easy withdrawal from life and action” [UM, II, Foreword].  Nietzsche 
pictures “the historical virtuoso of the present day” as “a passive sounding 
board” whose tone and message “lulls us and makes us tame spectators“ 
[UM, II, 6].  It is the desire to stand aside from life that links the scholar and 
the priest as practitioners of the ascetic ideal. In the “Advantages and 
Disadvantages” essay Nietzsche uses metaphors of mirroring, castration and
impotence to capture the passivity of the scholar, and, in particular, the 
historian. These metaphors Nietzsche repeats throughout his corpus in order 
to emphasise the same point.  In the “On the Advantages and Disadvantages” 
essay he ask the rhetorical question 
6[o]r is it selflessness when the historical man lets himself be blown into 
an objective mirror? [UM, II, 8, my translation]
In the same essay Nietzsche asserts that the scholar’s ideal of pure objectivity 
would characterise “a race of eunuchs”. [UM II 5]6
In Beyond Good and Evil [207] Nietzsche again captures the element 
of passivity and otherworldliness behind the exorbitant overvaluation of truth 
and objectivity by referring to “the objective person....the ideal scholar” as 
a mirror: he is accustomed to submitting before whatever wants to be 
known, without any other pleasure than that found in knowing and 
“mirroring”.
Later, in the same section, he refers to the scholar as a “mirror soul, eternally 
smoothing itself out”. These are themes that are also repeated in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra in the sections “Of Immaculate Perception” and “Of Scholars”.  In 
the first of these sections Zarathustra characterizes those who seek ‘pure 
knowledge’ as hypocrites, on the grounds that while they are men of earthly 
lusts they have “been persuaded to contempt of the earthly”.   Again, 
Nietzsche has recourse to the metaphors of passive mirroring, when he 
expresses the voice of those seekers of pure knowledge as follows:
For me the highest thing would be to gaze at life without desire … I 
desire nothing of things, except that I may lie down before them like a 
mirror with a hundred eyes.
He also repeats the metaphors of impotence and castration in that same 
section when those who seek pure knowledge are told,
[t]ruly you do not love the earth as creators, begetters …..But now your 
emasculated leering wants to be called ‘contemplation’!
The metaphor of the scholar as mirror is also used in the Genealogy.  
There, in describing modern historiography, which he characterises as being 
“to a high degree ascetic” and “to a still higher degree nihilistic”, Nietzsche 
says modern historiography’s “[n]oblest claim is that it is a mirror” [GM, III, 
26].7  In the same section there are multiple metaphors of castration and 
                                                          
6 The third essay of Genealogy, may, to some degree, be seen as a reprise of “On the Advantages and 
Disadvantages of History for Life”.  In both essays Nietzsche questions the pursuit of knowledge as an 
end in itself, and points out that this mentality betrays a fear of life.  However a significant difference is 
that the Genealogy contains much greater psychological insight into the motivation and mindset behind 
this pursuit.  Also it is much more sophisticated in the means it employs to get the reader to appreciate 
this point.  It is possible that by the time of the Genealogy Nietzsche had come to see that his untimely 
message of the hollowness at the core of our current culture needed to be delivered it a much more 
subtle way if it was to make an impression on his complacent, self-satisfied, audience.
7  Chris Janaway has helpfully pointed out that Nietzsche’s repeated negative references to passive 
mirroring when characterising the will to truth and objectivity are probably a deliberate reference to, 
and in contrast with, Schopenhauer who favourably spoke of the intellect “abolishing all possibility of 
suffering” [WWR, II, 368] when it renounces all interest and becomes “the clear mirror of the world” 
[WWR, II, 380].  It is presumably Nietzsche’s early struggles with Schopenhauer that first alerted him 
7impotence.  For instance, Nietzsche, with a side reference to the famous 
historian Renan, characterises certain “objective” “armchair” “contemplatives” 
in terms of their
cowardly contemplativeness, the lecherous eunuchry, in the face of 
history, the making eyes as ascetic ideas, the justice-Tartuffery of 
impotence! [GM, III, 26]
The core of Nietzsche’s objection to both the ascetic ideal and its last 
incarnation, the will to truth, as exhibited most extremely in the scholar, is that  
they both are a symptom of, and caused by, an  “aversion to life” [GM III, 28]. 
The world is a hostile place that resists most or our desires - this is a thesis 
Nietzsche shares with Freud and Schopenhauer.8 Most people, weak people, 
in the face of this resistance become scared of the world. They seek to turn 
away from it. The religious turn away by saying this world does not count, 
what counts is the world to come. The scholars turn away by saying that 
acting in the world is less valuable than standing back from the world, 
contemplating, understanding, and knowing it. As Nietzsche’s Zathathrustra 
puts it, “they want to be mere spectators” [TSZ, Of Scholars]. Both take, and 
try to justify, an essentially passive stance towards the world. They are 
passive because they are weak and scared, but they dress their passivity up 
as a virtue and a choice. Nietzsche values the (pre-Socratic) Greeks because 
they understood that life is essentially, and inevitably, painful, but they still had 
the strength to affirm it and act decisively, even horribly - think of Medea’s 
terrible revenge in the face of Creon’s dispossession of her.9  The Christian 
and modern men, in particular scholars, still are fundamentally obsessed with 
escaping the pain of this life, “the absence of suffering – this may count as the 
highest good” for them, hence their valorisation of passivity [GM, III, 17].10  
                                                                                                                                                                     
to the possibility that intellectual contemplation can function as a means for attempting escape from 
this painful world of becoming.
8 It might be thought that there is a fundamental difference between the resistance suffered by slaves 
and that faced by Nietzsche’s audience.  The latter of course belong to a dominant successful society.  
While there are differences, the key point is that that success is now the success of a herd animal who 
has still repressed many of his individual desires to pursue an alleged common good.  This is not to say 
that Nietzsche was against all repression.  Rather much like Freud, he favoured sublimation where the 
repressed desires are allowed to express themselves productively, albeit directed to new ends than those 
they originally sought.  Cf. author’s article [Reference omitted to facilitate blind reviewing] and section 
4. below.
9 This is a central theme in The Birth of Tragedy, for example, see sections 7-9.  In that work, still 
under the influence of Schopenhauer and Wagner, Nietzsche takes art, in particular tragedy, as 
providing the Greeks with the means to affirm life despite suffering.  As this influence waned art came 
to play a much less significant part in his account of the life affirming spirit of the Greeks. Thus in the 
first essay of the Genealogy, where the Greeks are clearly configured as life-affirming, there is no 
appearance of art as their means of affirmation.
10 In section sections 13-22 of the third essay of the Genealogy the ostensible subject is the ascetic ideal 
as personified by the ascetic priest. In these sections the ascetic priest is characterized as the sick 
physician to a sick herd. He attempts to combat the “dominant feeling of listlessness …first, by means 
that reduce the general feeling of life to its lowest point.  If possible no willing at all, not another wish” 
[GM, III, 17]. However these sections also contain many references that go well beyond priests, 
including references to anti-Semites, to Nietzsche’s contemporary, the philosopher Eugen Dühring, to 
modern European “Weltshmerz”.  These references already indicate that Nietzsche’s polemic against 
those who advocate passivity as a means of combating and avoiding the pains of life has a much wider 
target than just the priests. However, as argued above, it is only in section 23 that the full scope of his 
target comes clearly into view.
8Since all doing inevitably involves (the risk of) pain they seek to avoid doing, 
hence their valorisation of being over becoming.11 Nietzsche repeatedly uses 
the metaphors of mirroring, castration and impotence to viscerally bring home 
the degree of this passivity.  He is a philosopher who, more than most, uses 
metaphor as a marker of significance. The repetition is also a clear marker of 
the importance Nietzsche attaches to this theme. 12
Does the fact that Nietzsche attacks the will to truth because it is a 
manifestation of a passive attitude towards life, coupled with the fact that 
Nietzsche sees himself as the great advocate of life, entail that he condemns 
the will to truth unconditionally? That would be surprising for a philosopher 
who so often condemns the unconditional. Perhaps then his objection is to the 
elevation of truth to an end in itself.  There is something to this but it misses 
the focus of Nietzsche’s objection.  When Nietzsche objects to a thing, for 
example religion or the will to truth, it is important to place that thing in its 
relevant context.  The point here, one often made by Nietzsche himself, is that 
                                                          
11  For Nietzsche, the scholar’s valuing truth, like the religious persons valuing the world to come, is 
generally paired with a valorisation of being over becoming.  Even if the scholar were to take his truth 
to be truth about the world of appearance this would not abrogate Nietzsche’s point.  Fundamentally, in 
Nietzsche’s work, the being/becoming dichotomy aligns with the passive/active dichotomy.  This 
explain his rather monotonous emphasis on being over becoming throughout his corpus,  which is only 
broken in the Gay Science 370. There  he lets on that a valorisation of becoming in certain contexts can 
actually be manifestation of a rejection of life and a valorisation of being can in certain contexts be a 
manifestation of a healthy attitude to life.
12  An interpretation with a different point of emphasis is advanced in Brian Leiter’s generally excellent 
Nietzsche on Morality.  Leiter does allow that the unconditional pursuit of truth can be life denying.  
However he recognises this mainly on the limited score that certain truths can be so terrible that the 
very knowledge of them can be a threat to life.  Leiter does not recognise the full import of Nietzsche’s 
claim that the very will to truth is a will to escape this life, and indeed refers to this aspect of the 
asceticism of science as “only a minor theme in Nietzsche’s discussion” [Leiter, p. 265].  Besides the 
claim that certain truths “can be terrible, a threat to life” [ibid, p 267], Leiter claims the other major 
objection Nietzsche has to the overestimation of truth is that 
it supposes falsely, that our knowledge could be “presuppositionless”.  More precisely, the 
will to truth is a will to non-persepctival truth... [p. 268]
Now a number of things seem to have gone wrong here.  First, it seems strange that Nietzsche would 
get so worked up about a mere cognitive error, the mistake of taking one’s truths as absolute, 
presuppositionless truths.  Indeed, Leiter himself elsewhere points out that Nietzsche does not take 
such intellectual errors to be of great import. Recall Nietzsche’s exhortation concerning Christianity 
morality that “it is not error qua error that horrifies me at this sight” (EH, Why I am a Destiny, 7).  For 
Nietzsche the problem with the ascetic ideal, science, and indeed the will to truth, is not that they 
presuppose faulty beliefs or metaphysics, but that they manifest an entire attitude and orientation of 
hatred towards life – “that one taught men to despise the very first instincts of life” [ibid].  More 
generally this kind of abstract intellectual mistake, taking one’s truth as being without presuppositions, 
is not in itself of great concern to Nietzsche.  As Leiter himself elsewhere notes, Nietzsche generally 
thinks our abstract intellectual life is epiphenomenal in the sense that it may reflect and be caused by 
our deeper motivations and passions but it does not really influence them, or indeed our actions.  
Second, and relatedly, if the scholar merely suffers from a false belief could he not then simply correct 
it by changing to the view that his theories do not reflect any absolute, presuppositonless truth?   Indeed 
surely many scholars would resonate with the claim that truth is perspectival.  Note the disparaging 
remark from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, quoted above, about the scholar’s desire to mirror with one 
hundred eyes – this itself sounds more like perspectival than absolute knowledge.  Finally, and 
ironically enough, given Leiter’s hostility to Postmodernism, on Leiter’s reading postmodernist 
scholars would be exempt from Nietzsche’s critique of scholars since they clearly do not make the 
error of taking our knowledge to be without presuppositions.    
9something that is dangerous, unhealthy in a given context may well be 
beneficial in another.  Nietzsche is always a local rather than a global thinker.  
He will not simply condemn, for instance, the will to truth but rather will 
condemn it within a given context.  The point is what ends does it serve in a 
given context.  In the context of Christianity and the modern scholarly spirit he 
sees the will to truth as serving the purpose of slandering life.  But this still 
leaves room for him to recognise that in other contexts, or for given individuals 
within a specific context, the will to truth can be a manifestation of a robust 
health.  Thus, he clearly does not regard Goethe’s prodigious curiosity and 
will to truth as a negative phenomena.  And surely in his own case his insight 
into human nature, though bought at a terrible personal cost, is not something 
he sees as a negative manifestation of the will to truth.  It is a repeated theme 
in Nietzsche’s corpus that the stronger a being is the more truth they can 
endure.  It would be too facile to simply say that what separates Goethe and 
Nietzsche’s positive manifestation of the will to truth from the Christian’s or the 
scholar’s is that they unlike the later, do not regard truth as an end in itself. 
Would a typical scholar, say a postmodernist of today, who agreed that truth 
was no ultimate end, be any less a target of Nietzsche’s polemic?  And would 
a Goethe like figure who did indeed take truth to be the ultimate value be a fit 
subject for Nietzsche’s attack?  The will to truth in itself is not the object of 
Nietzsche’s attack.  Rather it is the will to truth in its now prevalent context of 
the Christian and scholar’s passive and negative orientation towards life that 
Nietzsche rejects.13
To understand the nature of Nietzsche’s complaint against the will to
truth in the context of its manifestation in modern men of science, and to 
contrast it with the healthier will to truth exhibited by rare individuals such as 
Goethe and Nietzsche himself, it is helpful to return to the second of his 
Untimely Meditations.
We saw how in the Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche raises the objection 
that the modern scholar with his emphasis on objectivity becomes a merely 
passive mirror of the world about him.  We further noted that the fact that 
Nietzsche so often repeats this theme attests to its importance. Another 
theme that Nietzsche repeats throughout the second of the Untimely 
Meditations is that the scholar, the modern man of science, falls “wretchedly 
apart into inner and outer, content and form” [UM, II, 4]14. It is for this reason 
that “our modern culture is not a living thing” [ibid.].  But what does this talk of 
inner and outer, content and form mean?  Recall that Nietzsche’s central 
objection to the scholar is that his knowledge is merely a personal, internal 
affair that does not express itself in outward action.  The content of his 
knowledge does not express itself in outward forms. Inner and content for 
Nietzsche refers to man’s internal world of thought, the outer and form refer to 
                                                          
13  While generally Nietzsche discusses the vita contemplativa in the context of its use as a negative life 
denying orientation (cf Daybreak 42-43), GS 310 shows that Nietzsche recognises that the vita 
contemplativa can in fact be the means to the highest form of creativity.
14  The emphasis on the inner/outer distinction though apparent enough in the Hollingdale translation of 
the Untimely Mediations is somewhat weakened by the fact that the German term ‘Inneres’ is 
sometimes translated as ‘inner’, occasionally as ‘interior’ and often as ‘subjectivity’. These translations 
though perfectly legitimate, nevertheless, steer the reader way from recognition of the centrality of the 
inner/outer distinction to Nietzsche’s thinking of the time.
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the external world of action.  Modern man’s unbridled exhortation of the will to 
truth  facilitates his emphasis on inner content to the exclusion of outer forms. 
Against this splitting Nietzsche recommends that a 
higher unity in the nature of the soul of a people must again be created, 
that the breach between inner and outer must vanish. [ibid]
Now note, this unity is exactly the characteristic that Nietzsche so often extols 
in Goethe and claims to have finally arrived at himself.  In them the will to truth 
does not express itself as a stepping back from the world in order to enter an 
otherworldly realm of ineffectual contemplation. Rather, it is an active part of 
their engagement with the world.  Nietzsche and Goethe possess active 
rather than passive knowledge.  Indeed Nietzsche’s “Advantage and 
Disadvantages” paper, which is his most sustained attack on knowledge as a 
means to inactivity, begins with the following quotation from Goethe, which he 
tells us he fully concurs with:
In any case I hate everything that merely instructs me without 
augmenting or directly invigorating my activity [UT, II, Foreword]
The importance of the notion of unity for genuine person is a theme that we 
will return to shortly.
The notion of knowledge as a means of withdrawal rather than 
engagement with the world is given a remarkable and fascinating expression 
in a minor theme touched on, but never fully developed, in the Genealogy. 
There Nietzsche suggests that language itself, for both the religious ascetic 
and the ascetic scholar, functions as a substitute passive satisfaction for the 
inability to achieve direct active possession of reality.  The contrast here is 
with a more active type (the master of the first essay) who merely uses brute 
force to take possession of what he desires.  The more timid priests, slaves, 
and scholars, make do, not with direct possession of reality, but with 
possession of the names of things.15 More importantly, these “morbid cobweb-
spinners”, weave such a fanciful linguistic and conceptual framework around 
things that soon those things are lost sight of completely [TI, Reason in 
Philosophy, 4].  The world in which they are clearly impotent is eliminated 
(from view) in favour of a vast conceptual structure over which they exercise 
great mastery.  In the first essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche gives a proto-
theory of language acquisition that contrasts the crude language of the 
masters, where words are used merely as tags (we might say, their words 
carried denotation without connotation), with the sophisticated language of the 
slaves (where connotation becomes more important than denotation).  Thus 
he characterizes the language of the masters in the following terms:
The lordly right of giving names extends so far that one should allow 
oneself to conceive the origin of language itself as an expression of 
                                                          
15 Nietzsche in several places directly canvases the idea that language and thought are means of 
appropriating reality, for example D 285, WP 423, WP584, GS 355.  At other places he talks of 
language and contemplation as a means of creating a substitute reality, for example D 43,  HAH I 11, 
and GS 354.
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power on the part of the rulers: they say “this is this and this”, they seal 
every thing and event with a sound, as it were, take possession of it. 
[GM, I, 2, Nietzsche’s italics]
This notion of sealing with a sound, mere vocables, clearly suggests the 
emphasis on denotation over connotation, an emphasis that is heightened a 
few sections later:
all the concepts of ancient man were rather at first  incredibly uncouth, 
coarse, external, narrow straightforward, and altogether unsymbolical in 
meaning  to a degree that we can scarcely conceive. [GM, I, 6, 
Nietzsche’s italics]
This “external”, ”unsymbolical”, language Nietzsche then contrasts with the 
language of aristocratic priests which has become “deepened, sharpened, 
and internalised”, with the conclusion that
[t]here is from the first something unhealthy in such priestly 
aristocracies and in the habits ruling them which turn away from 
action...but it is only fair to add that it is on this essentially dangerous 
form of human existence, the priestly form, that man first became an 
interesting animal, that only here did the human soul acquire depth and 
become evil – and these are the two basic respects in which man has 
hitherto been superior to other beasts! [ibid.]
The idea that language could ever be genuinely unsymbolical, and, in 
particular, the idea that the ancient Homeric Greeks were masters of a purely 
referential language is, of course, totally far fetched.  Nietzsche, a 
knowledgeable admirer of ancient Greece, could in no way be seriously 
endorsing such a claim.16  We do better, then, to take this as a typically 
hyperbolic expression of a very reasonable thought, namely, the thought that 
the conceptual world is for the passive slave types basically a means for 
obliterating a reality that they resent, whereas for the active master types it is 
a means of working with, and celebrating, a reality over which they exercise 
great mastery.17  The religious straightforwardly obliterate this world by 
                                                          
16 Wilfred Sellars, for one, does in fact endorse the claim that for initiates into language, in particular 
children, language originally functions as non-conceptual naming – their initial language use consists 
in the utterance of meaningless vocables.  However that goes on against a background where those 
vocables have their natural place in a full functioning conceptual framework wielded by their elders.
17  The interesting idea of the origins of the conceptual, as a substitute satisfaction for a reality that 
resists one’s desires, is something also suggested by  Freud  – the first entry into the conceptual being 
the fantasy of the breast, that fantasy being a substitute for the breast that at some point has been 
withheld from the baby by mother. Cf. S.E. Vol. 1, p.328 and Vol. V, p. 564.    Nietzsche, following 
Schopenhauer, is generally suspicious of the (conscious) mind and treats it is largely epiphenomenal.  
What he adds is that the development of mind is a fundamentally negative phenomenon, its 
development being the result of a failure to directly and instinctively navigate the world.  Nietzsche’s 
thoughts on this topic are both profound and presumably erroneous.  The chimera of a language 
affording direct, conceptually unmediated, contact with reality (Nietzsche’s seeming suggestion about 
the language of the Masters) is something that is a source of perennial confusion in philosophy, 
including, for instance, Derrida’s self-acknowledged pointless hand-wringing about the so-called 
“logocentric predicament”.  The idea that the conceptual somehow represents a fall from some 
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belittling its importance in contrast to their fantasy construction of a world to 
come. The scholar belittles this world by valorising the possession of 
knowledge and representations of it over acting in it.  Both these reactions are 
for Nietzsche essentially life-denying.
Of course, in the Genealogy and elsewhere, Nietzsche’s primary 
example of the life-denier is the Christian.  For him Nietzsche reserves his 
strongest rhetoric;  
this entire fictional world has it roots in hatred of the natural 
(actuality!)...But that explains everything. Who alone has reason to lie 
himself out of actuality? He who suffers from it.  But to suffer from it 
means to be an abortive reality. [A, 15 – Nietzsche’s italics]
Yet we should recognise here a voice not unrelated to that with which 
Nietzsche chastises the scholar in the passages quoted above. This talk of 
abortive reality is of a piece with his rhetorical question in the Untimely 
Meditations concerning the current age of “universal education”:
Are there still human beings, one then asks oneself, or perhaps only 
thinking- writing-, and speaking-machines. [UM, II, 5]
There are, indeed, vast differences in the way Nietzsche regards the 
scholar and the Christian.  In the latter he sees only forces inimical to life.  In 
the former and his objective sprit he sees much that is useful and for which 
we should be grateful [cf. BGE 207].  After all, it is the scholar, with his will to 
truth, who helps us see through the fabrications of religion.  But for Nietzsche 
[t]he objective man is an instrument  ... he is no goal, no conclusion and 
sunrise. [BGE, 207]
His essential passivity toward the world means that
[w]hatever still remains in him of a “person” strikes him as accidental, 
often arbitrary, still more disturbing; to such an extent he has become a 
passageway and reflection of strange forms and events even to himself. 
[ibid.]
This enigmatic talk of being a passageway to strange forms and events, of 
the arbitrary and the accidental, hints at some profound sense of alienation.  
But what exactly this involves is not thematized in Beyond Good and Evil.  To 
get a better understanding of what is as stake here we do well to return to the 
Genealogy.
                                                                                                                                                                     
mythical adamic position of grace of unmediated contact with reality is more worthy of psychological 
diagnosis, perhaps on Freudian lines suggested above, than of serious philosophical investigation. 
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Part II
4. Accidental, Arbitrary Moderns Vs. The Sovereign Individual 
When Nietzsche says in the preface to the Genealogy that we are 
strangers to ourselves, that we are unknown to ourselves, it is tempting to 
take this estrangement as merely a matter of our lack of self-knowledge.  But 
then we must ask the question why exactly this should be taken as a 
criticism?  Surely it cannot be that we are under some obligation to know the 
full truth about ourselves; that kind of imperative looks suspiciously like a 
manifestation of the very will to truth that is the object of Nietzsche’s critique in 
the third essay of the Genealogy.  What is more, Nietzsche has often told of 
the need for self-deception.  Indeed, Nietzsche in many places tells us that 
ignorance of one’s deeper drives and motivations can often be healthy 
phenomenon. This thought goes hand in hand with his general dismissal of 
consciousness as a weak, irrelevant, even disruptive force.  How can 
Nietzsche extol the virtues of knowledge of the self yet at otherwise praise 
ignorance of the self?  Again, part of the answer is to be found in the different 
ends knowledge and ignorance can serve in different contexts.  In the case of 
Wagner and himself he sees ignorance as something that helps a deeper 
unifying drive finally reach its full active expression.18  In the case of 
Christians and scholars, their ignorance merely serves to facilitate their 
passive attitudes and their splintering into weak fragmented personalities.  
This brings us to the deeper sense in which Nietzsche takes us to be 
strangers to ourselves.  As the Genealogy unfolds, beyond our mere 
ignorance, a deeper, though related, estrangement is suggested, namely; that 
of having parts of ourselves that are split-off.  These parts are split-off, not 
simply in the sense that we have no conscious access to them, but in the 
sense that we contain within us hidden affects and drives. These are separate 
movers that are not part of any integrated whole.  Taken to the extreme, this 
notion of being strangers to ourselves actually threatens the very notion of a 
unified self. That is to say, we have strangers within ourselves, so that, in fact, 
our self is no genuine self.  We are nothing more than a jumble of different 
voices/drives having no overall unity.19 Not wishing to directly threaten his 
audience with this frightening thought, Nietzsche brings this idea to his 
readers in very subtle ways.
In the first essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche playfully torments his 
audience with variations on this theme of being subverted from within.  For 
instance, the claim that Christian morality is nothing but the inheritor of a 
Jewish slave morality based on resentiment hints at the claim that his 
audience need not be worried about being “jewified” because, with their 
current morality, they are already as Jewish as they could be. The worry of 
being “jewified” was one that Germans of the 1880s were keenly aware of.  
                                                          
18  In reference to Wagner Cf. UM, II, 2 and in reference to Nietzsche Cf. EH, “Why I am So Clever”, 
9.
19  The Nietzschean theme that modern men are not genuine persons but mere jumbles of drives is one 
explored extensively in author’s article [reference omitted to facilate blind reviewing].
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Where a typical (liberal) German audience of Nietzsche’s time sees “The Jew” 
as a foreign external body that somehow needs to be cleansed and brought 
into the Christian-German world, Nietzsche is telling his audience that they 
themselves are in fact internally and fundamentally contaminated with 
Jewishness.20  This is a direct threat to the Germans’ sense of identify. The 
problem of German identity in the 19th century is hugely complex and not 
something to be seriously approached in detail in this essay.  However, what 
is worth noting here is that, because there was no unified German state until 
late into the 19th century, and because the notion of a common German 
language was a known fiction, one of the main means of forging a German 
identity was by contrast to those who were clearly not Germans.  Jews, in 
particular, were commonly denominated as the paradigm of the un-German.  
Nietzsche’s claim that the Germans are already “jewified” brings home to his 
reader in an uncanny way his theme that they are strangers to themselves. It 
is presumably his sense of provocative playfulness that leads Nietzsche to 
suggest that the Jewish elders actually gathered as a cabal and consciously 
repudiated Christ.  This, alleged Nietzsche, they did solely in order to make 
Christ’s destructive Jewish slave message more appealing to the non-Jews:
Was it not part of the secret black art of truly grand politics of revenge.... 
that Israel must deny the real instrument of its revenge before the world 
as a mortal enemy and nail it to the cross so that “all the world”, namely 
all the opponents of Israel, could unhesitatingly swallow just this bait?21
[GM, I, 8]
                                                          
20  This subversive theme is repeated in the Antichrist were Nietzsche says
The Christian, that ultima ratio of the lie, is the Jew once more – even thrice more [A, 44]
The (despicable) rhetoric of Verjudung (Jewification) – overly polite scholars often refer to it by the 
misleadingly benign title ‘Judaization’ -  is something that current readers are largely unaware off.  The 
background for this was the question, raised by the ongoing 19th century Jewish emancipation, of how 
the Jews were to be integrated into the modern state.  Nietzsche belongs to a series of 19th century 
intellectuals who sought to turn this question on its head, asking, not how the Jews are to be 
emancipated from their inferior state, but, how we (Christians) are to be emancipated from the 
Jewishness that has now enslaved us. The claim that we are already thoroughly Jewish is the central 
claim of Marx’s On the Jewish Question and Wagner’s Judaism in Music – the later of which 
Nietzsche was clearly acquainted with.  Both Marx and Wagner generally equate being jewified 
(verjudet) with materialism, Nietzsche equates it with acceptance of  the morality of pity (slave 
morality).
21  Note, this is posed as a question, which may be taken to suggest that Nietzsche himself does not 
seriously endorse this conspiracy theory. The idea of a Jewish conspiracy against the Christian world is 
at least as old as the medieval blood libel that each year the elders of Israel convened to decide upon a 
young Christian child to be slaughtered and drained of blood to be used for making the Passover matzo.  
In the 19th century, after Napoleon convened the famous Sanhedrin of the Jews in 1806 in order to 
settle the question of Jewish emancipation and integration into the new Europe, new myths about 
Jewish conspiracies, including conspiracies of the bourse, arose with alarming regularity.  While 
Nietzsche’s little conspiracy joke about the Jews repudiating Christ in order to get the Christians to 
swallow the bait is perhaps relatively harmless, the contemporaneous publication of Wilhelm Marr’s 
Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum [The Victory of Jewry over Germandom], and 
other conspiracy works, culminating in the Russian secret police’s infamous conspiracy work The 
Protocols of the elders of Zion, were to have far more devastating effects. It is of no credit to 
Nietzsche, and indeed displays a knowing recklessness on his part, that he participated in the rhetoric 
of verjudung. That he intentionally tweaks his audience, giving a subversive twist to this usually 
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We have seen that in the first essay Nietzsche torments his audience 
with the thought that they are already infected with a Jewish voice, one that 
they themselves would take to be thoroughly foreign.  In the second essay 
Nietzsche implicitly raises the question of whether such a thoroughly mixed 
being can be capable of genuine agency. This he does in a rather subtle way, 
by introducing a figure, the “sovereign individual” capable of genuine agency, 
and then implicitly contrasting this strong commanding figure with the weak 
will of the wisps of his day.  
For Nietzsche genuine agency, including the right to make promises, is 
the expression of a unified whole.  The second essay begins with the 
question:
To breed an animal with the right to make promises – is this not the 
paradoxical task that nature has set itself in the case of man? is this not 
the real problem regarding man? [GM, II, 1]
The text might easily lead the unwary reader to think this is a task already 
accomplished, again leading the reader into a sense of complacent 
satisfaction. The sense that Nietzsche is talking of past events is heightened 
when, having first raised this question of nature’s task, he concentrates on the 
pre-history of man, and man’s first acquiring of deep memory – memory burnt 
in by punishment.  The task of acquiring memory is one that has been clearly 
accomplished; it is something that his audience can proudly lay claim to.  
Nietzsche, after raising his question, immediately refers to the breeding of an 
animal with the right to make promises as a problem that “has been solved to 
a large extent”. This furthers the sense that the task is largely behind us.  
However, when a few pages later Nietzsche introduces “the end of this 
tremendous process” as the “sovereign individual”, his audience should at 
least have a suspicion glimmering of whether they themselves are this proud, 
noble, sounding individual or the “feeble windbags” he despises.  Nietzsche 
describes the sovereign individual in hyperbolic tones clearly not applicable to 
ordinary individuals.  He describes him as one
who has his own protracted will and the right to make promises and in 
him a proud consciousness, quivering in every muscle, of what has at 
length been achieved and become flesh in him, a consciousness of his 
own power and freedom… [and who] is bound to reserve a kick for the 
feeble windbags who promise without the right to do so [GM, II, 2]
It is typical of Nietzsche’s deliberate, and deliberately confusing, 
caginess, that it is not at first clear whether the sovereign individual is a 
creature already achieved or one yet to come.   The very terms Nietzsche 
uses to describe the sovereign individual - “proud”, “quivering in every 
muscle”, “aware of his superiority “, “like only to himself”, “bound to honour his 
peers ”- clearly hark back to the descriptions of the masters of the first essay.  
Since his audience are meant to identify themselves as the inheritors of slave 
                                                                                                                                                                     
wholly negative rhetoric, by configuring the Jewish slave revolt as creative and as making man 
interesting, giving him depth, hardly mitigates this recklessness. 
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morality, it is clear that they cannot be identified with this sovereign individual, 
who, unlike them, has been “liberated from the morality of custom”, and who 
is “autonomous and supermoral”, a “lord of the free will”.  The implicit 
message to his audience is that you are not sufficiently whole to have the right 
to make promises; you have no free will,  but are merely tossed about willy-
nilly by a jumble of competing drives, and, hence, you cannot stand surety for 
what you promise. You can give no guarantee that the ascendant drive at the 
time of your making a promise will be effective when the time comes to 
honour that promise.
5. Nietzsche on Free Will
In the sections of the second essay of the Genealogy, where Nietzsche 
discusses the figure of the sovereign individual, his use of the Kantian 
terminology of free will and autonomy is in marked contrast to his generally 
negative use of that terminology.  Nietzsche often disparages the notion of 
free will and autonomy. Thus he says in the Anti-Christ 
In Christianity ... Nothing but imaginary causes (’God’, ‘soul’, ‘ego’, 
‘spirit’, ‘free will’ – or ‘unfree will’). [A, 15]
In Twilight of the Idols he simply refers to “the error of free will” [TI, IV, 7]. 
However, in those passages where he disparages the notion of free will it is 
clear that what is a stake is the notion of a will autonomous from the causal 
order, an uncaused cause. It is free will in this “superlative, metaphysical 
sense” [BGE 21] that Nietzsche rejects.  This still leaves room for a more 
imminent notion of free will.  It is this kind of free will that Nietzsche 
presumably envisages for his sovereign individual who is
.... autonomous .. the man who has his own independent, protracted will 
.... this master of a free will [GM, II, 2 – Nietzsche’s italics].
One gets a sense of Nietzsche’s account of free will, and its relation to 
the tradition, by contrasting it with that of David Hume.  Hume, a compatibilist, 
famously argued that “liberty of spontaneity” (free will) is consistent with the 
denial of “liberty of indifference” (determinism).22  On Hume’s account, one 
                                                          
22  Cf. Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Section 11. Note, I do not mean to suggest here  that 
Nietzsche is best read as explicitly endorsing both the claim that all events are determined by prior 
events and the claim that free will is possible.  Rather, he is a compatibilist in the sense that he does not 
take determinism to be incompatible with free will. As will become clear below, Nietzsche is best read 
as one who has implicitly realized that the issues involved in making sense of free will do not have a 
direct connection with determinism. I do believe Nietzsche is committed to the idea that some rare 
individuals act freely; as for determinism, I do not think he has any real commitment there.  More 
generally, I think such metaphysical views were not within his philosophical provenance – he 
occasionally flirted and dabbled with such theses but did not give them sufficient reflection necessary 
for genuine commitment.  More typically, he uses such metaphysical claims as occasional tools to help 
dislodge various ideas he takes to be harmful, for instance the moralist’s obsessions about guilt and 
responsibility. Nietzsche is a Kulturkritiker and psychologist, perhaps even a moral philosopher, but a 
metaphysician he is not, nor did he care to be.  The one exception to this claim is perhaps, his thought 
concerning the will to power.
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acts freely where that action stems from one’s character.  Character for Hume 
is simply glossed as one’s deeper dispositions.  Here is not the place to 
canvass the various problems with Hume’s notion of character.  What is 
interesting for us is that Nietzsche may be seen as offering a similar account 
of free will, with the very important difference that he gives a much more 
robust account of character.  To have a character is to have a stable, unified, 
and integrated, hierarchy of drives. This is a very demanding condition that 
most humans fail to meet: 
In the present age human beings have in their bodies the heritage of
multiple origins, that is opposite and not merely opposite drives and 
value standards that fight each other and rarely permit each other any 
rest.  Such human beings of late cultures and refracted lights will on 
the average be weaker human beings. [BGE 200]
In the Nachlass from the period of the Genealogy Nietzsche explicitly draws 
the conclusion that
one should not at all assume that many humans are "people" .... the 
“person” is a relatively isolated fact. [KSA, 12, 491, my translation]
The sovereign individual, who has a unified, independent, protracted will 
counts as having a genuine character, being a person.  Modern man, who is 
at the mercy of a menagerie of competing forces, internal and external, has 
no such character.23
Why after so much denigration of the terminology of free will and 
autonomy does Nietzsche in the Genealogy employ it in a positive fashion?  
Presumably, as a subtle challenge to his readers.  Rather than simply 
arousing his audiences’ resistance with flat denials of free will and autonomy 
in the transcendental sense, Nietzsche uses that terminology in a positive, 
non-transcendental, manner in describing the sovereign individual. He then 
seeks to unsettle his audience with the uncanny idea that autonomy and free 
will are achievements of great difficulty, achievements which they themselves 
have by no means attained. While the thought that free will does not exist is 
disturbing, how much more so is the thought that free will does exist but one 
does not oneself possess it!
While Nietzsche may believe in free will, in a compatibilist sense, he 
clearly does not mean to endorse the notion that possession of a free will 
means the one who acts in a particular way could have done otherwise.24
Now those who take the key issue concerning free will to be the question of 
moral responsibility, and the viability of appraisals of praise and blame, will 
claim that this is no genuine notion of free will. For them an action is free only 
if the agent could have done otherwise.  But there is another way of 
                                                          
23  For more on this see author’s article. [Reference omitted for blind reviewing]
24  In HAH, I, 105 Nietzsche explicitly says of both “he who is punished” and “he who is rewarded” 
that neither punishment nor reward are deserved because “he could not have acted otherwise”.   There 
are of course forms of compatibilism which allow that one might have done otherwise, but this is not a 
position evidenced in Nietzsche’s text.
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approaching the free will debate.  This other way does not see the debate 
directly through the question of responsibility, but, rather, approaches it from 
the question of agency.  Where one approach begins with the question “For 
what acts is one responsible?”, the other begins with the arguably profounder 
question “What is it to act in the first place, what is it to be a self capable of 
acting?”.  Those who take the question of responsibility as paramount to the 
free will question, tend to write as if we already have a notion of self and 
action more or less firmly in place and are only raising the question of whether 
such selves are ever to be held responsible for their actions.  The other 
approach seeks to problematize the very notions of self and action. This is 
part of the import of the famous dictum from the Genealogy that "the doer is 
merely a fiction added to the deed" [GM, I, 13],  Now Nietzsche does, of 
course, want to question our practices of praising and blaming, our practices 
of assigning responsibility.  This is part of his ongoing battle against the 
dominant Judeo-Christian worldview in which responsibility, and, in particular, 
blame, are key notions.  This aim does indeed account for many of his 
negative comments about free will.  But ultimately the more profound 
Nietzsche wants to raise the question about what exactly it is to be a genuine 
self.  Indeed his whole attack on the Judeo-Christian worldview is predicated 
on his belief that it is fundamentally inimical to the development of genuine
selves. 
To interpret Nietzsche as an opponent of free will is to emphasise a 
purely negative aspect, his hostility to Judaeo-Christian notions of 
responsibility. This undoubtedly is an important and oft repeated theme in 
Nietzsche’s work and hence is a defendable interpretation of Nietzsche.  To 
interpret Nietzsche as giving a positive, albeit, arguably, revisionist account of 
free will is to emphasise a positive and wholly original aspect, his notion that 
under the right conditions genuine agency, a truly great achievement, is 
possible. Furthermore this interpretation helps us to properly appreciate the 
famous passage in Gay Science [125], where Nietzsche’s “madman” tells us 
that we must ourselves become Gods to be worthy of the deed of killing God.  
To become Gods is to be autonomous, self legislators who are not 
subservient to some external authority, be it a God, the sumum bonum, or an, 
allegedly, universal moral law.  This interpretation allows us to see a 
Nietzsche who has come to grips with a central problem of modern philosophy 
in a way that many of his predecessors, contemporaries, and even 
successors, have failed to do.  If we take part of the central trajectory of 
modern philosophy to be the move from a religious to a secular worldview, we 
(should) see that giving up the metaphysics of God and soul raises a crucial 
problem about exactly what we are.  The modern tradition offers a number of 
answers; we are in essence reasoners (Descartes, Kant)25; we are bundles of 
sensations (Hume). None of these answers are particularly satisfactory.  
Nietzsche offers an interesting and rather original alternative.  He claims that 
in a sense we do not exist.26  This is not a version of that kind of academic, 
                                                          
25  Of course, Descartes and Kant were theists.  Nevertheless, the intellectual trajectory of their work, 
whether intended or not, was inevitably towards a secular worldview.
26 The Hume of the Appendix to his Treatise came to realise that the account of the self given in the 
Treatise rendered the self non-existent (Cf. Hume, 1978, p.p. 635-636).  However this for Hume was 
an unintended and unacceptable consequence of his philosophy.  For Nietzsche our failure to achieve 
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philosophic, scepticism that brings philosophy into deserved disrepute.  The 
existence of human bodies, like the existence of the so-called external world 
is not something Nietzsche would ever dream of really denying.  What 
Nietzsche questions is whether there are genuine selves inhabiting these 
bodies.  In place of empiricist or rationalist accounts of the self, Nietzsche 
offers, what might be called, a naturalist-aestheticist account: To have a 
genuine self is to have an enduring co-ordinated hierarchy of drives.  Most 
humans fail to have such a hierarchy; hence they are not sovereign 
individuals.  Rather they are a jumble of drives with no coherent order.  Hence 
they are not genuine individuals or, we might say, selves. 
Nietzsche’s various attacks on the Kantian notions of autonomy and 
free will have two main objectives. The negative objective is to show that the 
notion of a will that transcends the causal order is intellectually unacceptable 
– a point that is hardly unique to Nietzsche.  The positive, and more profound 
and original, objective is to offer his readers the challenging notion that 
genuine autonomy, and hence existence as an individual and self, is possible 
for some.   This challenge should awaken his readers to the profoundly 
disturbing possibility that they themselves are not fully persons.
Part III
6. Nietzsche and the Uncanny
In section 10 of the third essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche again 
invokes the notion of free will.  There he suggests a contrast between 
philosophers as they have occurred so far, “world-negating, hostile towards 
life, not believing in the senses,” with a possible successor who, presumably 
unlike his predecessors, has sufficient “will of the spirit, freedom of will” [GM, 
III, 10, Nietzsche’s italics].  In this passage, like the earlier ones concerning 
the sovereign individual and free will, Nietzsche leaves the reader in some 
doubt as to whether he is talking about something already achieved or yet to 
be achieved.   In both these cases Nietzsche creates a kind of uncanny effect 
on the reader.  The uncanny here is operating in Freud’s sense of something 
that is disturbingly both familiar and unfamiliar. 27
                                                                                                                                                                     
genuine selfhood, and the possibility, for at least a select few, of overcoming that failure, is the very 
point of much of his philosophy.
27  In his Essay, The Uncanny, Freud characterizes the uncanny as 
 something which is secretly familiar which has undergone repression and then returned from 
it. [S.E., p. 245] 
In that essay Freud notes that psychoanalysis itself can be seen as a case of the uncanny [ibid. p. 243]. 
In fact, most readers of Freud’s essay are struck by its very uncaniness. Given Freud’s general attempt 
to suppress his huge intellectual debt to Nietzsche, and one suspects, especially to the Genealogy, one 
of the uncanniest aspects of Freud’s essay is that it, like the first essay of the Genealogy, begins with an 
etymological investigation.  The temptation to assume that this is a, disguised, perhaps even, 
unconscious expression of Freud’s debt to Nietzsche, and especially the Genealogy, where the notion 
of the uncanny is both used and mentioned more than in any other of Nietzsche’s text, is near 
overwhelming.
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Let us first consider the case of the sovereign individual and then 
return to that of the philosopher.
The sovereign individual is, at first, seemingly familiar to his readers as 
modern man, the possessor of memory and the right to make promises. But 
Nietzsche’s text, by characterising the sovereign individual in terms typically 
applied to the masters of the first essay, disturbingly suggests a gulf between 
the sovereign individual and modern man, the inheritor of slave morality. The 
sense of the uncanny comes not simply through the confusion about who 
exactly is the sovereign individual, but also by a certain play on temporality.  
Is Nietzsche talking about who we are in the present or is he talking about 
some envisaged successor?  
The same questions of identity and temporality produce an uncanny 
effect when Nietzsche describes philosophers in section 10 of the third essay 
of the Genealogy. He begins with “the earliest philosophers”;
to begin with the philosophic spirit always had to use as a mask and 
cocoon the previously established types of contemplative man ... a 
religious type. [Nietzsche’s italics]
The reference to the earliest philosophers suggests some distance between 
modern philosophers of Nietzsche’s era and the subjects of his descriptions.  
This suggestion is furthered when Nietzsche then says,
the ascetic priest provided until modern times the repulsive caterpillar 
form in which alone the philosopher could live and creep about. 
[emphasis mine]
Yet when Nietzsche then immediately asks the rhetorical question “Has this 
really altered?”[Nietzsche’s italics], his reader is left with the uneasy feeling 
that perhaps the repulsive caterpillar form is not really a thing of the past. 28
These temporal shifts are important for creating an uncanny sense of 
dislocation in the Genealogy;  what is far away often turns out to be quite 
close; and what is apparently already with us turns out to be yet to come.  A 
notable example of such dislocation occurs in his characterisation of the 
"counteridealists“ in section 24 of the third essay.  These he accuses of 
                                                          
28  Dario Galasso in his important forthcoming Ph.D thesis Nietzsche: Asceticism, Philosophy, History, 
argues convincingly that in sections 5-10 of the third essay, where Nietzsche discusses the meaning of 
the ascetic ideal for philosophers, there are various subtle temporal shifts and identity shifts at work.  
He notes that Nietzsche at times identifies the philosopher as a successor to the priest, continuing the 
ascetic ideal’s negative valuation of life.  At other times Nietzsche identifies the philosopher with a 
more positive version of asceticism.  On the positive account withdrawal is merely the means to allow 
the philosopher space to form his own creations. Withdrawal here does not embody a rejection of life 
but a means of adding to life.  The solution to this seeming contradictory account is that when 
Nietzsche is associating philosophy with the ascetic ideal in a negative way he is referring to 
philosophy as it has been so far practiced.  When he gives the positive account of philosophical 
asceticism he is giving an account of philosophy as it should, and he hopes will one day be, practiced.   
That Nietzsche throughout the relevant sections of the third essay moves without much in the way of 
explicit signaling from reference to past philosophers to reference to philosophers of the future is part 
of a deliberate strategy of unsettling his readers.
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unknowingly sharing the ideal they explicitly repudiate, the acetic ideal, 
because “they still have faith in truth”.  Interestingly, amongst these 
counteridealists he includes “pale atheists, antichrists, immoralists, nihilists”.   
Now these terms can be applied to Nietzsche himself, and, moreover, he 
himself has done so in various places.  The rhetorical effect here is striking; 
Nietzsche by his insinuating conspiratorial tone has suggested that he and his 
reader have now seen things that others have completely missed, namely, the 
continued prevalence of the ascetic ideal.  But then in implicitly accusing 
himself of still being involved with the ascetic ideal does that accusation not 
equally fall on his reader? 
A similar uncanny effect marks Nietzsche’s claims about the Jews and 
slaves in the first essay.  Jewish slaves would at first seem a very foreign 
people, especially for a 19th century German audience, a people who had 
very recently emerged as surprising victors in the Franco-Prussian war. But 
as the Genealogy progresses the distance between the psychological make-
up of the Jewish slaves and modern man seems to progressively shrink so 
that the unfamiliar merges with the familiar, each taking on the traits of the 
other.  The Jewish slave turns out to have conquered the whole Western 
world (not just France!), and modern European man turns out to have 
continued the Jewish slave’s hostility to the real world.
Nietzsche also has recourse to the notion of the uncanny in the 
Genealogy when characterising nihilism as “the uncanniest of monsters” [GM, 
III, 14].  While that particular passage merely heralds nihilism as a possibility, 
in his notebooks of the same period he is much more explicit,  
Nihilism stands before us: whence comes this most uncanny of all 
guests? [KSA, 12, p.125 – my translation]
His immediate answer, in keeping with the general tenor of the Genealogy, is 
that it is the will to truth that, having destroyed the metaphysics that 
underpinned our values, is slowly bringing belated recognition that those 
values themselves now lack any coherent foundations. Thus we are inevitably 
being led to a void of values. But why does he call nihilism an uncanny guest 
and the uncaniest of monsters?  I conjecture it is because he realises that for 
his audience nihilism is, on first approach, rather distant and unfamiliar, and 
yet in some deep, perhaps, as yet, unarticulated sense, profoundly close and 
familiar.  It is unfamiliar to his audience because, valuing truth, objectivity, 
science, education, progress, and other Enlightenment ideals, they would 
regard themselves as having firm, deeply held values.  It is somehow familiar 
because they would have an inchoate sense that the very demand central to 
the Enlightenment ideal, the demand that all assumptions must face the test 
of reason, is a test that consistently applied would put those, indeed, all 
values, into question.  Nietzsche, like David Hume, realised that if we were to 
take seriously the Enlightenment ideal of making no assumptions and 
subjecting every belief, every value, to the test of pure reason, we would in 
fact be left with a total devastation of all beliefs and values.  It is just this 
devastation that he predicts for Europe’s future – it is for Nietzsche the first 
step to a full appreciation of the death of God.  A fundamental aim of the 
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Genealogy is to allow his audience a possible self-awareness that will 
inevitably hasten such an appreciation.  This is not to say that Nietzsche sees 
nihilism as a goal in itself.  However what he does believe is that Europe must 
first go through nihilism if it is to reach the possibilities of creating genuinely 
life-affirming values.29
The theme of the uncanny and uncanny themes proliferate throughout 
the text of the Genealogy. In no other text of Nietzsche’s is there anywhere 
near as many occurrences of the term ‘uncanny’ (unheimlich) and its 
cognates.  The importance of this notion for appreciating Nietzsche’s text is 
attested to by Nietzsche himself in the very first lines of the section in Ecce 
Homo dealing with the Genealogy. There Nietzsche characterises that work  
as follows:
Regarding expression, intention, and the art of surprise, the three 
inquiries, which constitute this Genealogy, are perhaps uncannier than 
anything else written so far.  [EH, Genealogy of Morals A Polemic]
Indeed, the uncanny makes its first appearance in the Genealogy as 
early as section 5 of the preface. There Nietzsche gives, what may now, in 
retrospect, be seen as, a hint that his announced theme might not be his real 
theme.  In section 4 of the preface he tells us that in Human, All Too Human
he had already approached the subject that is, allegedly, central to the 
Genealogy, namely the question of the origins of morality.  In section 5 he 
then tells us that even in that work he was really concerned with the value of 
our morality, rather than “my own or anyone else’s hypothesizing about the 
origin of morality”. In particular, he tells us that what he saw as “the great
danger to humanity” was
the will turning against life, the last sickness gently and melancholically 
announcing itself: I understood the morality of compassion…. as the 
most uncanny symptom of our now uncanny European culture.
I would finally add that the concept of the uncanny helps us explain the 
function of the Genealogy as a history that is not really a history.  Above I 
spoke of various temporal displacements that Nietzsche uses; the ancient 
Jewish slaves who reappear as modern Christians, even as modern truth 
loving atheists; the sovereign individual who appears first as something 
already achieved, then as a possible man of the future; the modern 
philosopher who has thrown off the mask of the religious type, but then is 
perhaps not so very distant from this caterpillar form.  We also noted, in 
footnote 3 above, that in talking of the nobles in the first essay the text, 
without any forewarning, shifts from a frame of reference focused on ancient 
Greece to a frame of reference focused on ancient Rome.  We also noted 
how Nietzsche bates his audience with the ridiculous suggestion of an 
imaginary ancient Jewish conspiracy.  These and other factors, for instance, 
the absence of all the scholarly apparatus typical of a historical work 
(references, footnotes and the like), the very sweeping nature of Nietzsche’s 
                                                          
29 Cf. WTP 2 for his most succinct statement of the inevitability of nihilism.
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various historical narratives, their lack of historical specificity, and the very fact 
that he subtitles his work a polemic, create the unsettling feeling that 
Nietzsche is, despite his explicit rubric of historical interest, not really, or, at 
least, primarily, telling us about the historical origins of our morality. 
Furthermore, the idea of Nietzsche being devoted to getting the history right 
soley for the sake of getting at the historical truth does not sit well with the 
central themes of the third essay, with its disparagement of the will to truth.  
Nor does it sit well with his animadversions about history and the scholars 
search for truth in his essay The Advantages and Disadvantages of History for 
Life.  What he is interested in is certain psychological truths about who we 
are; he is fundamentally interested in making available to us the true meaning 
of his initial, seemingly passing, comment that we are strangers to ourselves.  
Nietzsche’s genealogies use, perhaps, at times, fabulous, historical narratives 
to show the employment of different uses, meanings and interrelationships of 
various concepts over time. Crucially Nietzsche, following Hegel, believes that 
only by understanding the temporal layering of meanings can we really grasp 
the current import of our concepts. The very potted nature of his actual 
historical narratives and his various games of temporal displacement serve to 
let us eventually see that his text is not what it first appears, and claims, to be. 
It is not in fact a simple historical narrative, but rather a narrative of 
psychological development and discovery, culminating for the reader in 
section 23 of the third essay. There, after having been exposed to the 
disgusting nature of the ascetic ideal, the reader is shatteringly brought to see 
that he himself is the embodiment of that ideal, so that afterward he may  “ask 
completely amazed, completely disconcerted, “What did we actually 
experience just now?” still more: “who are we actually?”.30
This interpretation of Nietzsche, as not primarily aiming for historical 
accuracy, helps explain an often-overlooked conundrum concerning the first 
essay of the Genealogy.  In that essay Nietzsche paints a picture of the 
Greeks as healthy, active, and happy.  This is the picture championed by the 
early romantics, for instance Goethe and Winkelmann.  It is the image that 
captured the popular imagination of Germany throughout the 19th century.  
                                                          
30  This is not to say that Nietzsche does not think that his historical narratives in their broad outline 
contain a good deal of truth.  It is only to claim that historical truth is not his ultimate aim.  He needs at 
least some initial plausibility to his narrative if it is to have the desired rhetorical effect on his readers, 
and truth in the broad sense is a suitable way to achieve that plausibility.  The note at the end of the 
first essay of the Genealogy suggesting a “series of academic prize-essays” that might provide the kind 
of historical and philological detail his essay lacks, I take, to some degree, to be another instance of 
Nietzschean irony and baiting of his audience.  Nietzsche had long since departed the academic world 
and made well known his general opinion of what he considered  the often able but always pathetic  
Fachleute that inhabit that twilight realm. That said it should be noted that Nietzsche’s relation to 
history is indeed more complicated than the above suggests.  This is indicated in the preface of volume 
II of HAH where Nietzsche says
 what I said against the historical sickness  I said as one who had slowly and toilsomely learned 
to recover from it  and was in no way prepared to give up ‘history’ thereafter because he had 
once suffered from it.
Nietzsche throughout his career maintained a resolutely Hegelian thinker in holding that the meaning, 
or, better, meanings, of a thing are mediated by its history.
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Yet Nietzsche, in his first book, The Birth of Tragedy, famously rejected this 
vision, claiming that the Greeks were profoundly pessimistic, realising that life 
is inevitably painful, at least until Socrates, an essentially slavish type, 
mendaciously convinced the Greeks that reason and the pursuit of truth could 
alleviate all that is wrong with the world.  Why does Nietzsche revert to this 
more idyllic, conventional picture of the ancient Greeks?  To understand this it 
helps to consider that Nietzsche in the Genealogy repeatedly preys upon the 
conventional characterisations of various historical types, for instance the 
conventional characterisation of the Jews as malicious, subterranean, overly 
cerebral, schemers.  These nods to conventional representations are best 
understood as devices to draw his audiences in by playing to their prejudices.  
Of course, Nietzsche merely draws his audience in order to later surprise 
them with his eventual revelation that they themselves are the Jews (carriers 
of ascetic ideals) “even thrice more” [cf. the quotation from The Antichrist in 
footnote 16 above].  But the point to be noted here is that his wilful, simplistic, 
mischaracterization of the ancient Greeks makes little sense if we see him as 
aiming for historical accuracy.  It is perfectly understandable if we see him as 
primarily manipulating his audience to a psychological insight.
In Ecce Homo Nietzsche says “[t]hat a psychologist without equal 
speaks from my writings, is perhaps the first insight reached by a good 
reader” [Ecce Homo, Why I Write Such Good Books, 5].  This is one of 
Nietzsche’s few self-assessments which I take to be absolutely correct.  In 
reading Nietzsche we should follow the implied advice of looking for 
psychological, rather than a philosophical, or historical, insights. The 
fundamental insight of the Genealogy is that with the change from the 
religious to the secular worldview we may have changed our beliefs about the 
nature of this world, we unlike the religious accept this as the one and only 
world, but we have still fundamentally clung to the same hostile attitude 
towards it.   It is because we fail to engage with, in both a cognitive and 
deeper sense,  the nature and the level of our resentment that we remain, so 
profoundly, strangers to ourselves.  We should not simply keep the model of 
the psychologist in mind when trying to unravel the what of Nietzsche’s text 
but also in unravelling the how of it.  By uncannily invoking the pathos of 
distance, and deliberately confusing the temporal scope of his claims, 
Nietzsche has found an ingenious, subterranean, method of getting his highly 
challenging and subversive message to slowly sink into his readers, without 
immediately provoking the defences a more direct approach would surely 
arouse. 31
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